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Abstract
Post-hoc explanation methods are gaining popularity as tools for interpreting,
understanding, and debugging neural networks. Most post-hoc methods ex-
plain decisions in response to individual inputs. These individual inputs are
typically drawn from the test set; however, the test set may be biased or may
only sparsely invoke some model behaviours. To address these challenges, we
introduce BAYES-TREX, a model-agnostic method for generating distribution-
conforming examples of known prediction confidence. Using a classifier prediction
and a data generator, BAYES-TREX can be used to visualize class boundaries; to
find in-distribution adversarial examples; to understand novel-class extrapolation;
and to expose neural network overconfidence. We demonstrate BAYES-TREX
with rendered data (CLEVR) and organic data (MNIST, Fashion-MNIST). Code:
github.com/serenabooth/Bayes-TrEx.
Figure 1: Given a Corgi/Bread classifier and a generative model for the data, we generate prediction
level sets, or sets of examples of a target prediction confidence. (A) Existing adversarial approaches
can perturb a given image to the target prediction confidence (e.g. PCorgi = PBread = 0.5); however,
such examples are “out-of-distribution.” (B, C, D) BAYES-TREX, on the other hand, takes a specified
data distribution to sample “in-distribution” examples in the target prediction level set (e.g., likely
Corgi, likely Bread, or ambivalent between Corgi and Bread). Top right: the classifier level set of
(PCorgi = PBread = 0.5) overlaid on the data distribution heatmap. Example (A) would not be sampled
because its likelihood is low under the generative model, while example (C) would be sampled.
Bottom right: As sampling directly from the true posterior is infeasible, we relax the formulation by
widening the level set. By specifying different data distributions (Figure 3), we can uncover inputs
that invoke various model behaviors to improve model transparency by example (Section 4.3 - 4.7).
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 2: A preprocessed CLEVR example and its SmoothGrad saliency map [55]. This example is
generated, not drawn from the test set. BAYES-TREX is tasked with finding a scene which contains
no spheres but is misclassified as containing a sphere. The inferred example is composed of only
cylinders and cubes, but the classifier is 97.1% confident this scene contains 1 sphere. The saliency
map highlights the small red cylinder, indicating this object was confused for a sphere. Indeed,
without the small red cylinder, the classifier confidence of containing 1 sphere drops to 0.1%.
1 Introduction
Debugging, interpreting, and understanding neural networks can be challenging [48, 39, 12]. Existing
interpretability methods include visualizing filters [64, 49], saliency maps [64, 53], input perturba-
tions [51, 41], prototype anchoring [27, 36, 9], tracing with influence functions [31], and concept
quantification [17, 28]. While some post-hoc interpretability methods analyze intermediary network
components such as convolutional layers [5, 49], most methods provide explanations which justify
decisions for specific input examples. Finding and analyzing myriad inputs which invoke the gamut of
model behaviours facilitates transparency by example. However, the inputs used by local explanation
methods are typically drawn from the test set, which may be biased or may only sparsely invoke some
model behaviours. This can make it challenging to extract meaningful insights with only test inputs.
Expanding the test set without new labels is impossible, but generative models can represent the
underlying data distributions. We propose a tool to help provide transparency by example that varies
the underlying input distributions via generative models. BAYES-TREX samples inputs at a known
prediction confidence: for example, PCorgi = 0.7, PBread = 0.3 for a Corgi/Bread classifier (Fig. 1).
We call the set of all input examples that meet this prediction confidence the p-level set. Given a
specified or learned data distribution and a classifier, BAYES-TREX generates level-set examples from
the posterior of a hierarchical Bayesian model by applying Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC)
inference methods. This applies across generative models: we show its use with VAEs and GANs
(MNIST and Fashion-MNIST [63]), and with a scene-graph-rendered dataset (CLEVR [26]).
BAYES-TREX can aid transparency by example in different contexts. By specifying an ambiguous
prediction target, BAYES-TREX can generate examples to visualize class boundaries. By restricting
the generator to not produce certain classes, BAYES-TREX can generate “in-distribution” adversarial
examples—these cause model failures, but are better suited for human assessment than typical
adversarial examples. By introducing novel classes for generation, BAYES-TREX can help model
designers anticipate how their models will behave. Further, BAYES-TREX examples can be used as
input to existing explanation techniques (Fig. 2). Lastly, we show how BAYES-TREX can be used to
expose network overconfidence, as we demonstrate on the domain-adapted model ADDA [60].
2 Related Work
2.1 Interpreting Neural Networks
A typical approach for interpreting a neural network is to view the model’s activation-maximizing
‘filters’ [49, 13]. Without regularization, these filters are unnatural images; to address this, Nguyen et
al. used a generative adversarial network as a prior to ensure the generated filters appear realistic,
balancing activation maximization with realism [45]. While these activation-maximizing filters can
help diagnose individual units in a neural network, understanding pattern-matching between inputs
and filters remains challenging [49, 47]. Instead of finding optimized images which maximize neuron
activations, BAYES-TREX finds in-distribution inputs which invoke a specified model response—
including arbitrary prediction confidence targets such as ambivalence between classes.
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Saliency maps are the local counterpart to filters; saliency maps project feature activations to input
pixel space to highlight regions of interest in inputs [64, 53]. While saliency maps have been used
successfully for model diagnosis [64] and are now ubiquitous tools for interpreting neural networks,
these visualizations can appear reasonable even when output from an untrained network [30, 1].
Other interpretability tools such as LIME [51] and SHAP [41] perturb a given input and score how
these perturbations affect classification. Another approach, TCAV, scores the relative importance of
concepts to a neural network’s classification for a given example [17, 28]. Notably, all these methods
work on a per-example basis and assume that the example is given. Such examples are typically drawn
from a test set or in-use failures; however, the test set may be biased or may only sparsely invoke
some model responses, and failures may not be observed by model designers. Model explanations
require a two-stage pipeline. First, we need a method for mining additional interesting examples,
leveraging both test and train data distributions. We can then invoke local interpretation methods to
explain these examples, as shown in Fig. 2 and Appendix K. To our knowledge, BAYES-TREX is the
first work dedicated to mining interesting inputs for evaluation with local explanation methods.
2.2 Adversarial Examples for Neural Networks
Neural networks are known to be susceptible to adversarial examples, or perturbed inputs designed to
cause network failures. Network predictions are sensitive to even small perturbations [56, 35, 4, 8,
46, 19]. A common approach to generating adversarial examples starts with an initial input—either
random noise or a test image—and uses a gradient-based method to iteratively optimize a distance
function, modifying the input to cause neural network failure. The examples generated through this
process are unlikely given the training data and are therefore out-of-distribution [37]. Consequently,
many defenses against adversarial attacks rely on examples being out-of-distribution [23, 14]. In
contrast, BAYES-TREX exposes “in-distribution” adversarial examples [18] which cause failures but
have high prior probability of being sampled from the data distribution. As traditional adversarial
examples are either composed of random noise or imperceptible perturbations, analyzing these
examples does not help humans understand neural network behaviours. The in-distribution adversarial
examples generated by BAYES-TREX instead show systemic, human-interpretable network failures.
2.3 Confidence in Neural Networks
BAYES-TREX draws examples from confidence level sets in neural networks. Guo et al. showed that
many neural networks are overconfident, with incorrect predictions often having high confidence [21].
While many approaches aim to address this network overconfidence problem [58, 34, 16, 7], our
work is complementary to these efforts. Rather than altering the confidence of a neural network,
BAYES-TREX instead infers examples of a particular confidence. If the model is overconfident,
BAYES-TREX may return few, if any, samples with ambivalent predictions. Meanwhile, BAYES-
TREX may find many misclassifications with high confidence. As such, BAYES-TREX can be used
to assist in the diagnosis of overconfident networks. In our experiments (Section 4.7), we find that a
popular domain adaptation technique produces a more overconfident model than a baseline model.
3 Methodology
Given a classifier f : X → ∆K which maps a data point to the probability simplex of K classes, the
goal is to find an input x ∈ X in a known distribution p(x) such that f(x) = p for some particular
prediction confidence p ∈ ∆K . We consider the inference problem of sampling from the posterior
p(x|f(x) = p) ∝ p(x) p(f(x) = p|x) (1)
When the measure of the level set {x : f(x) = p} is small or even zero, sampling directly from this
posterior using MCMC methods is infeasible: the posterior being zero everywhere outside of the
level set means that it is unlikely for a Random-Walk Metropolis sampler to land on x with non-zero
posterior, and the gradient being zero everywhere outside of this level set means that a Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo sampler does not have the necessary guidance toward the level set either.
To enable inference, we relax the formulation by accepting x when f(x) is close to p (Fig. 1). Let u
be a random variable (or vector), with conditional distribution u|x ∼ q(f(x)) and target u∗, such that
f(x) = p ⇐⇒ Eq[u|x] = u∗. (2)
3
We now need to sample from the new posterior
p(x|u = u∗) ∝ p(x)p(u = u∗|x). (3)
Under expectation, when the sampled data has high probability, the classifier prediction matches p.
For a given prediction confidence, assign p = p∗ = [p1, . . . , pK ]T . Let u = [u1, . . . , uK ]T .
ui|x ∼ N
(
f(x)i, σ
2
)
, u∗i = pi, (4)
where σ is a hyper-parameter determining the level-set relaxation (e.g., see Figure 1).
Since u is sampled from a normal distribution, this formulation is asymptotically exact. Formally:
Lemma 3.1 limσ→0 p(x|u = u∗) = p(x|f(x) = p). As σ goes to 0, the approximate posterior
distribution approaches the true posterior distribution of interest.
We consider two specific instantiations for sampling high confidence and ambivalent examples. These
instantiations correspond to important BAYES-TREX use cases, including sampling of in-distribution
adversarial examples, novel class extrapolation examples, and class boundary examples.
1. High confidence: pi = 1,p¬i = 0. The classifier should be as confident in its class i prediction
as possible—irrespective of the correctness of the classification. For this case:
u|x ∼ N (f(x)i, σ2) , u∗ = 1. (5)
2. Binary ambivalence: pi = pj = 0.5,p¬i,j = 0. The classifier should be equally ambivalent
between class i and class j, while not predicting any other classes. For this case:
u1|x ∼ N
(|f(x)i − f(x)j |, σ21) , u∗1 = 0, (6)
u2|x ∼ N (min(f(x)i, f(x)j)− max
k 6=i,j
f(x)k, σ
2
2), u
∗
2 = 0.5, (7)
with u = [u1, u2]T , u∗ = [0, 0.5]T . σ1 and σ2 are hyperparameters.
While the formulation in Eqn. 4 is applicable to arbitrary confidence assignments, it requires the
number of auxiliary variables in u to be equal to the number of classes, posing scalability issues for
large numbers of classes. Eqns. 5–7 exemplify alternate formulations using fewer auxiliary variables.
Rather than sampling directly from the data distribution, we sample in the latent factor space of a
generative model, Z. Z is mapped to X via a deterministic reconstruction function g : Z → X .
To summarize, given
x = g(z) (8)
u|z ∼ q(f(g(z))), (9)
p(z|u = u∗) ∝ p(z)p(u = u∗|z), (10)
we wish to sample z according to Eqn. 10 and reconstruct the example x = g(z) for model inspection.
3.1 Inference Details
While there are many inference methods which may be used to sample from the posterior, we imple-
ment in particular two Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods: Random-Walk Metropolis
and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. In our experiments, we apply Random-Walk Metropolis when the
prediction is not differentiable with respect to z (i.e., when rendering is non-differentiable). When a
gradient is available, we instead use Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. For the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
method, we use the No-U-Turn sampler [25, 43] and the probabilistic programming language Pyro
for implementation [6]. All hyperparameters σ are arbitrarily chosen to be 0.05 for all experiments.
Selecting appropriate stopping criteria for MCMC algorithms is an open problem. State-of-the-art
approaches require a gold standard inference algorithm [10] or specific properties of the posterior
distribution, such as log-concavity [20]. As neither of these requirements are met for our general use
cases, we select stopping criteria based on heuristic performance and cost of compute. As CLEVR
scenes require GPU-intensive rendering, we typically select a stopping critieria of 500 samples. For
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we select a stopping criteria of 2000 samples.
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Figure 3: Relations of classifier training data (PC , red) and generator training data (PG, yellow). (a)
PC and PG are equal. (b) PG is a subset of PC . (c) PG and PC overlap. (d) PC and PG are disjoint.
4 Experiments
BAYES-TREX enables the evaluation of a classifier on a target generative distribution PG irrespective
of the distribution of the classifier training set PC . We demonstrate the versatility of BAYES-TREX
on four relationships between PG and PC , as illustrated in Figure 3.
In Section 4.3, we consider PC = PG (Figure 3(a)). This case finds in-distribution examples. In
Section 4.5, we consider PG with narrower support than PC (Figure 3(b)). Specifically, PG cannot
generate data from a particular class. In this case, high-confidence samples—as judged by the
classifier C—with PG as the generative distribution reveals in-distribution adversarial examples of C.
In Section 4.6 and 4.7, we analyze the classifier C for out-of-distribution extrapolation and domain
adaptation behaviours by considering PC and PG with overlapping or disjoint supports (Figure 3(c)
and (d)). Representative results are in the main text; further results are in Appendices D - J.
4.1 Datasets
We evaluate BAYES-TREX on rendered data (CLEVR) and organic data (MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST). In all CLEVR experiments, we use the pre-trained classifier distributed by the original
authors [26]. Since CLEVR rendering is not differentiable, we use Random-Walk Metropolis for
sampling. For probabilistic programming, we use a custom prior, consisting of a Gaussian proposal
for the continuous variables (e.g., x-position) and categorical proposal for the discrete variables (e.g.,
color), with a high probability for the current value and uniform low probabilities for other values. For
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST experiments, we train the classifiers; architectures in Appendix A. For
domain adaptation analysis, we use the ADDA model and training code provided by the authors [60].
For CLEVR, we render scene graphs as the data generator. For (Fashion-)MNIST, we train and
use both VAE and GAN models as the data generators. The latent distribution for these GANs and
VAEs—p(z)—is a unit Gaussian. VAEs and GANs are known to be imperfect representations of
underlying data distributions [3]. To evaluate how well these generative models reproduce their
training distributions, we report Fréchet Inception Distance scores [24]; see Appendix B.
4.2 Quantitative Evaluation
We evaluate how well BAYES-TREX-generated examples match the specified prediction target; a
subset of these results are presented in Table 1 (full summary in Appendix C). This analysis confirms
the inferred samples have predicted confidence closely matching the specified targets, indicating that
the MCMC methods used by BAYES-TREX are successful for the tested domains and scenarios.
(a) P5 Spheres = 95.7% (b) P2 Blue Spheres = 91.1% (c) MNIST (d) Fashion-MNIST
Figure 4: High-confidence samples. (a, b): CLEVR, with target class and predicted confidence. (c):
MNIST Digit 0-3. (d): Fashion-MNIST classes of T-shirt, trousers, pullover and dress.
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Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of the predicted confidence of the samples over 10 trials.
Prediction confidence is for the target class, or two target classes in binary ambivalent and graded
confidence cases. Appendix C presents the comprehensive extension of this table for all experiments.
Evaluation Dataset Target Prediction Confidence
High Confidence
MNIST P4 = 1 0.998 ± 0.008
Fashion PCoat = 1 0.983 ± 0.021
CLEVR P2 Blue Spheres = 1 0.892 ± 0.245
Binary Ambivalent MNIST (P1 = 0.5, P7 = 0.5) (0.490± 0.024, 0.489± 0.025)Fashion (PT-shirt, PDress) (0.480± 0.022, 0.482± 0.021)
Graded Confidence MNIST (P8 = 0.2, P9 = 0.8) (0.170± 0.039, 0.788± 0.040)Fashion (PT-shirt = 0.7, PTrousers = 0.3) (0.685± 0.039, 0.281± 0.040)
In-Distribution Adv.
MNIST P8 = 1 0.982 ± 0.024
Fashion PBag = 1 0.967 ± 0.026
CLEVR P1 Cube = 1 0.929 ± 0.062
OOD Extrapolation
MNIST P6 = 1 0.998 ± 0.007
Fashion PSandal = 1 0.995 ± 0.013
CLEVR P1 Cylinder = 1 0.959 ± 0.031
Domain Adaptation MNIST P5 = 1 0.998 ± 0.007
4.3 High, Ambivalent, and Graded Confidence Examples
We first evaluate BAYES-TREX by finding highly confident examples. Figure 4 depicts samples on
all three datasets; additional high confidence examples are in Appendix D. Next, we find examples
where the neural network is ambivalent between two classes. We use a VAE generative model for
(Fashion-)MNIST. Figure 5 shows a matrix of ambivalent examples from each pair of classes (e.g.
0v1, 0v2, ..., 8v9). As is expected, not all pairs result in successful sampling: for example, we were
unable to find an ambivalent example with equal prediction confidence between a 7 and a 0. Note
these examples are ambivalent from the classifier’s perspective; some may be readily classified by a
human. Appendix E contains more examples and a latent space visualization of class boundaries.
In addition to fully ambivalent examples, BAYES-TREX can also sample from level sets which
interpolate between classes (Figure 5(d)–5(e)). Appendix F contains a complete interpolation.
(a) Pairwise ambivalent examples
(b) P1 = 0.5, P7 = 0.5
(c) PPullover = 0.5, PShirt = 0.5
(d) P8 = 0.3, P9 = 0.7
(e) PT-Shirt = 0.6, PTrouser = 0.4
Figure 5: Ambivalent and graded confidence examples. 5(a): Each entry of the matrix is an ambivalent
example for the classes on its row and column. Blacked-out cells indicate sampling failures. 5(b) and
5(c): Additional pairwise ambivalent examples. 5(d) and 5(e): Graded confidence examples.
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(a) 1 Cube (93.5%) (b) 2 Cylinders (76.6%) (c) MNIST (d) Fashion-MNIST
Figure 6: In-distribution adversarial examples, using a generator which is unable to produce examples
of a target class. (a): CLEVR, 1 Cube. Note that no cube is present in the sample. (b): CLEVR, 2
Cylinders. (c) MNIST, adversarial examples for 0-4. 0s are composed of 6s; 1s of 8s; 2s of 0s, and so
on. (d) Fashion-MNIST, adversarial examples for sandal, shirt, sneaker, bag, and ankle boot.
4.4 Ambivalent Examples and Overconfidence
Using VAEs, BAYES-TREX can infer ambivalent examples for (Fashion-)MNIST. However, inference
fails when using GANs. The FID scores show the (Fashion-)MNIST GANs are better generators than
their VAE counterparts (see App. B); the GAN-generated images are generally sharper and more
visually realistic. We assert the failure to infer ambivalent examples with a GAN is due to the network
being consistently confident when evaluating realistic, sharp images. We experimentally verify this:
when we explicitly train a classifier to have ambivalent confidence using a KL-divergence loss, using
a GAN to sample ambivalent targets succeeds. This experiment is described in detail in Appendix G.
BAYES-TREX is also unable to generate ambiguous examples for CLEVR. While (Fashion-)MNIST
networks are high performing, with accuracies of ≈99%, CLEVR accuracy is ≈60% [26]. By defini-
tion, a high-performing network is not necessarily overconfident, even when highly confident on all
examples [21]. However, BAYES-TREX’s inability to sample ambivalent CLEVR examples is likely
due to overconfidence. This problem has previously been observed in CLEVR-style settings [29].
4.5 In-Distribution Adversarial Examples
By revoking the generator’s ability to create objects of specific classes, BAYES-TREX can also find
“in-distribution” adversarial examples. Like traditional adversarial examples, these cause network
failures. However, these are better suited for human assessment as they are not composed of apparent
noise or imperceptible perturbations. For a classifier trained on the entire dataset, we can expose
class-c adversarial examples by sampling using a data distribution that excludes class-c examples.
The generator distribution support is a subset of the classifier’s support (Fig. 3(b)). For CLEVR, we
revoke the generative model’s ability to produce objects of a target class and sample high confidence
images for that target (Fig. 6(a) and 6(b)). In Fig. 6(a), the classifier is highly confident there is one
cube. As confirmed by the saliency map (App. K), the classifier mistakes the shiny red cylinder for a
cube. Collating such examples can enable data augmentation to increase network reliability [15].
For (Fashion-)MNIST, for each class c, we train a GAN on the dataset with class-c removed. Fig. 6(c)
and 6(d) depict adversarial examples for digits 0-4 in MNIST and sandal, shirt, sneaker, bag, and ankle
boot in Fashion-MNIST, respectively. We observe several interesting phenomena. For MNIST, some
thin 8s are classified as 1s and particular styles of 6s and 9s are classified as 4s. For Fashion-MNIST,
most adversarial examples come from semantically similar classes, e.g. sneaker↔ ankle boot. Less
intuitively, chunky shoes are likely to be classified as bags. Additional experiments in Appendix H.
4.6 Novel Class Extrapolation Examples
BAYES-TREX can also be used to understand model extrapolation behaviours on novel classes.
Specifically, the generator can produce examples of a novel class but cannot produce examples of
a target class. Novel classes are not present in the classifier’s training data (Fig. 3(c, d)). For a
CLEVR instance, the generator can produce a novel object—a cone—but cannot generate cubes. We
observe that the classifier confidently mistakes cones for cubes (Fig. 7(a), 7(b); App. K). When an
MNIST classifier does not see digits 7 and 8 during training, it confidently mistakes these for digits
0, 1, and 9 (Fig. 7(c)). A Fashion-MNIST classifier confuses sneakers for sandals and ankle boots.
While confusing sandals and ankle boots may be reasonable extrapolation, the classifier also mistakes
different bags as sandals, shirts, and ankle boots (Fig. 7(d)). Additional experiments in Appendix I.
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(a) 1 Cube (98.5%) (b) 5 Cubes (92.5%) (c) MNIST (d) Fashion-MNIST
Figure 7: OOD extrapolation samples. (a, b): For CLEVR, we introduce a new shape–a cone–to
the generative model, revoke the generative model’s ability to produce target class objects, and infer
high-confidence examples. (c, d): For (Fashion-)MNIST, we train classifiers on subsets of the data
(digits 0, 1, 3, 6, 9 for MNIST and Pullover, Dress, Sandal, Shirt, and Ankle boot for Fashion-MNIST),
and train the data generators with the excluded data. The incorrect predicted class label is shown
above the images. Average prediction confidence is ≈99%. Additional details in Appendix I.
(a) Baseline examples (b) ADDA examples
Figure 8: Highly confident examples for each class (0 to 9) of the baseline model and ADDA model.
A manual labeling reveals more misclassified high-confidence examples with ADDA (Appendix J).
4.7 Domain Adaptation
BAYES-TREX can also be used to analyze domain adaptation. Specifically, consider the SVHN→
MNIST domain adaptation problem. We train two classifiers, a baseline classifier on labeled SVHN
data only, and the adversarial discriminative domain adaptation (ADDA) classifier [60] on labeled
SVHN data and unlabeled MNIST data. Indeed, domain adaptation improves classification accuracy:
the baseline classifier achieves 61% accuracy on MNIST while the ADDA classifier achieves 71%.
But is this the whole story? Using BAYES-TREX, we sample high confidence examples for each
classifier using an MNIST GAN (Fig. 8). We re-label those inferred high-confidence examples and
compute the accuracy. We find the baseline model achieves higher accuracy on these high confidence
examples (80% vs 71%; see Supp. Table 8). This fine-grained analysis suggests the ADDA model is
more overconfident than the baseline. Experiment protocol and analysis in Appendix J.
5 Discussion
We propose a model inspection method of sampling level set examples of known prediction confidence.
BAYES-TREX selects examples such that the sampled data has high likelihood under a known
data distribution. To achieve this, we use a Bayesian inference formulation and use probabilistic
programming to sample from the posterior. On both procedurally-defined data (CLEVR) and organic
data (MNIST and Fashion-MNIST), we demonstrate that BAYES-TREX can sample close to the
specified prediction confidence target while remaining in the known distribution. In the experiments,
we show how BAYES-TREX can be used to synthesize ambivalent predictions, uncover in-distribution
adversarial examples, and understand novel-class extrapolation and domain adaptation behaviours.
By specifying the underlying distributions, BAYES-TREX can generate examples beyond the scope of
the test set. These generated examples can facilitate transparency by example. Still, extracting insights
from individual examples remains challenging, even with the aid of local explanation methods (e.g.,
Fig 2). We instead need to cluster and visualize trends in these generated examples, to increase model
legibility. To accompany clustering, we further need to estimate coverage of the level set.
The current BAYES-TREX formulation only works for classification. Beyond classification, structured
prediction is necessary for safety-critical robotics applications such as motion planning. As future
work, to adapt BAYES-TREX for such models, we must incorporate dependency among outputs.
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Broader Impact
BAYES-TREX can allow humans to build more accurate mental models of how neural networks
make decisions. Further, BAYES-TREX can be useful for debugging, interpreting, and understanding
networks—all of which can help us build better, less biased, increasingly human-aligned models.
However, BAYES-TREX is subject to the same caveats as typical software testing approaches: the
absence of exposed bad samples does not mean the system is free from defects. One concern is how
system designers and users will interact with BAYES-TREX in practice. If BAYES-TREX does not
reveal degenerate examples, these stakeholders might develop inordinate trust [33] in their models.
Additionally, the examples which BAYES-TREX generates may be used as inputs to downstream
local explanation methods. As a community, we know that many of these local explanations can be
challenging to understand [49, 47], misleading [1, 30, 52], or susceptible to adversarial attacks [54].
In human-human interaction, even nonsensical explanations can increase compliance [32]. As we
build post-hoc explanation techniques, we must evaluate whether the produced explanations help
humans moderate trust and act appropriately—for example, by overriding the model’s decisions.
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A Network Architecture for MNIST & Fashion-MNIST
For all experiments on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the VAE architecture is shown in Table 2 (left), and the
GAN architecture is shown in Table 2 (right). For all experiments on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST except for
the domain adaptation analysis, the classifier architecture is shown in Table 3 (left). The classifier used in the
domain adaptation analysis is the LeNet architecture, following the provided source code, shown in Table 3
(right). All experiments are performed with a single NVIDIA GeForce 1080 GPU.
Table 2: Left: VAE architecture; right: GAN architecture.
Encoder input: 28× 28× 1
Flatten
Fully-connected 784× 400
ReLU
Mean: Fully-connected 400× 5
Log-variance: Fully-connected 400× 5
Decoder input: 5 (latent dimension)
Fully-connected 5× 400
ReLU
Fully-connected 400× 784
Reshape 28× 28× 1
Sigmoid
Input: 5 (latent dimension)
Reshape 1× 1× 5
Conv-transpose: 512 filters, size=4× 4, stride = 1
Batch-norm, ReLU
Conv-transpose: 256 filters, size=4× 4, stride = 2
Batch-norm, ReLU
Conv-transpose: 128 filters, size=4× 4, stride = 2
Batch-norm, ReLU
Conv-transpose: 64 filters, size=4× 4, stride = 2
Batch-norm, ReLU
Conv-transpose: 1 filters, size=1× 1, stride = 1
Sigmoid
Table 3: Left: classifier architecture in all experiments except domain adaptation analysis; right:
LeNet classifier architecture in domain adaptation analysis (used in code released by ADDA authors).
Input: 28× 28× 1
Conv: 32 filters, size = 3× 3, stride = 1
ReLU
Conv: 64 filters, size = 3× 3, stride = 1
Drop-out, prob = 0.25
Max-pool, size = 2× 2
Flatten
Fully-connected 9216× 128
ReLU
Drop-out, prob = 0.5
Fully-connected 128× 10
Soft-max
Input: 28× 28× 1
Conv: 20 filters, size = 5× 5, stride = 1
ReLU
Max-pool, size = 2× 2
Conv: 50 filters, size = 5× 5, stride = 1
ReLU
Max-pool, size = 2× 2
Flatten
Fully-connected 800× 500
ReLU
Fully-connected 500× 10
Soft-max
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B Evaluating Learned Data Distribution Fit: Fréchet Inception Distance
(FID) Scores
Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) scores are one measure for evaluating how well a learned data distribution
fits the ground truth distribution. We report these FID scores for all learned generative models in Table 4. We
note that GANs consistently outperform VAEs for all data distributions. We further note that all generative
models perform better on MNIST data than on Fashion-MNIST. MNIST GANs are the best performing models;
Fashion-MNIST VAEs are the worst performing models. We measure FID for each VAE and GAN. In particular,
these include the generative models trained for exposing in-distribution adversarial examples by leaving out
one class at a time. Further, these FID scores include generative models trained on select subsets of the data for
novel class extrapolation studies. For example, one GAN is trained only on the MNIST digits {2, 4, 5, 7, 8}.
Table 4: Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) scores for all learned data distributions; a lower score
indicates a better distribution fit. We note that GAN performance is markedly superior to VAE
performance, and MNIST performance is superior to Fashion-MNIST performance across all models.
Results are computed across 1000 samples. Fashion-MNIST class mapping: [0: T-shirt, 1: Trouser, 2:
Pullover, 3: Dress, 4: Coat, 5: Sandal, 6: Shirt, 7: Sneaker, 8: Bag, 9: Ankle boot].
Model Dataset Subset FID
GAN
MNIST
All 11.83
Without 0 12.10
Without 1 12.08
Without 2 13.57
Without 3 12.71
Without 4 12.25
Without 5 12.21
Without 6 11.86
Without 7 11.64
Without 8 12.31
Without 9 12.34
{2, 4, 5, 7, 8} 13.45
Fashion
All 29.44
Without 0 28.91
Without 1 31.18
Without 2 30.11
Without 3 28.95
Without 4 30.43
Without 5 27.67
Without 6 29.68
Without 7 28.56
Without 8 30.87
Without 9 29.22
{0, 1, 4, 7, 8} 33.11
Model Dataset Subset FID
VAE
MNIST
All 72.33
Without 0 71.28
Without 1 75.36
Without 2 64.77
Without 3 63.66
Without 4 66.96
Without 5 63.31
Without 6 67.64
Without 7 62.45
Without 8 64.14
Without 9 66.57
—– —–
Fashion
All 87.89
Without 0 89.21
Without 1 92.02
Without 2 91.20
Without 3 85.51
Without 4 88.38
Without 5 84.17
Without 6 85.58
Without 7 84.93
Without 8 83.66
Without 9 81.48
— —
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C Full Quantitative Confidence Results
Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the full extension of Table 1 in the main text. These results show that the inferred
samples have predicted confidence closely matching the specified confidence targets. This indicates the MCMC
methods used by BAYES-TREX are successful for the tested domains and scenarios. Queries for 5 Cubes in the
out-of-distribution CLEVR experiments use a stopping criterion of 1500 samples instead of the standard 500.
Averages reported across 10 inference runs.
Table 5: Full table of measured prediction confidence values for BAYES-TREX samples on high-
confidence examples (left) and in-distribution adversarial examples (right). Accompanying visual
results in Appendices D and H.
Target Prediction Confidence
P0 = 1 0.999 ± 0.006
P1 = 1 0.999 ± 0.003
P2 = 1 0.999 ± 0.006
P3 = 1 0.999 ± 0.005
P4 = 1 0.998 ± 0.008
P5 = 1 0.999 ± 0.006
P6 = 1 0.998 ± 0.007
P7 = 1 0.998 ± 0.007
P8 = 1 0.999 ± 0.004
P9 = 1 0.998 ± 0.007
PT-Shirt = 1 0.991 ± 0.016
PTrouser = 1 0.999 ± 0.006
PPullover = 1 0.984 ± 0.019
PDress = 1 0.993 ± 0.008
PCoat = 1 0.983 ± 0.021
PSandal = 1 0.998 ± 0.008
PShirt = 1 0.987 ± 0.020
PSneaker = 1 0.994 ± 0.016
PBag = 1 0.999 ± 0.006
PAnkle Boot = 1 0.996 ± 0.012
P5 Spheres = 1 0.943 ± 0.020
P2 Blue Spheres = 1 0.892 ± 0.245
Target Prediction Confidence
P0 = 1 0.981 ± 0.027
P1 = 1 0.953 ± 0.028
P2 = 1 0.968 ± 0.028
P3 = 1 0.969 ± 0.027
P4 = 1 0.955 ± 0.030
P5 = 1 0.990 ± 0.018
P6 = 1 0.970 ± 0.026
P7 = 1 0.968 ± 0.029
P8 = 1 0.982 ± 0.024
P9 = 1 0.983 ± 0.022
PT-Shirt = 1 0.964 ± 0.029
PTrouser = 1 (sample failure)
PPullover = 1 0.886 ± 0.027
PDress = 1 0.970 ± 0.026
PCoat = 1 0.938 ± 0.030
PSandal = 1 0.968 ± 0.030
PShirt = 1 0.938 ± 0.032
PSneaker = 1 0.969 ± 0.028
PBag = 1 0.967 ± 0.026
PAnkle Boot = 1 0.971 ± 0.027
P1 Cube = 1 0.929 ± 0.062
P1 Cylinder = 1 0.972 ± 0.021
P1 Sphere = 1 0.843 ± 0.266
P2 Cylinders = 1 0.545 ± 0.230
Table 6: Full table for graded confidence examples for MNIST (left) and Fashion-MNIST (right);
accompanying visual results in Appendix F.
Target Prediction Confidence
P8 = 0.0, P9 = 1.0 (0.002± 0.006, 0.990± 0.016)
P8 = 0.1, P9 = 0.9 (0.030± 0.039, 0.936± 0.051)
P8 = 0.2, P9 = 0.8 (0.170± 0.039, 0.788± 0.040)
P8 = 0.3, P9 = 0.7 (0.275± 0.041, 0.682± 0.040)
P8 = 0.4, P9 = 0.6 (0.378± 0.040, 0.578± 0.040)
P8 = 0.5, P9 = 0.5 (0.477± 0.039, 0.477± 0.039)
P8 = 0.6, P9 = 0.4 (0.581± 0.038, 0.374± 0.039)
P8 = 0.7, P9 = 0.3 (0.680± 0.041, 0.275± 0.039)
P8 = 0.8, P9 = 0.2 (0.788± 0.040, 0.167± 0.041)
P8 = 0.9, P9 = 0.1 (0.926± 0.050, 0.039± 0.040)
P8 = 1.0, P9 = 0.0 (0.989± 0.016, 0.002± 0.007)
Target Prediction Confidence
PT-Shirt = 0.0, PTrousers = 1.0 (0.001± 0.004, 0.995± 0.012)
PT-Shirt = 0.1, PTrousers = 0.9 (0.026± 0.035, 0.950± 0.050)
PT-Shirt = 0.2, PTrousers = 0.8 (0.166± 0.040, 0.791± 0.041)
PT-Shirt = 0.3, PTrousers = 0.7 (0.275± 0.037, 0.686± 0.038)
PT-Shirt = 0.4, PTrousers = 0.6 (0.379± 0.038, 0.586± 0.038)
PT-Shirt = 0.5, PTrousers = 0.5 (0.436± 0.040, 0.459± 0.040)
PT-Shirt = 0.6, PTrousers = 0.4 (0.583± 0.038, 0.382± 0.037)
PT-Shirt = 0.7, PTrousers = 0.3 (0.685± 0.039, 0.281± 0.040)
PT-Shirt = 0.8, PTrousers = 0.2 (0.790± 0.037, 0.177± 0.037)
PT-Shirt = 0.9, PTrousers = 0.1 (0.936± 0.045, 0.029± 0.041)
PT-Shirt = 1.0, PTrousers = 0.0 (0.985± 0.019, 0.000± 0.003)
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Table 7: Full table for out-of-distribution, novel class extrapolation (left) and domain adaptation
(right) samples (using the ADDA model). Accompanying visual results in Appendices I and J.
Target Prediction Confidence
P0 = 1 0.976 ± 0.025
P1 = 1 0.988 ± 0.186
P3 = 1 0.987 ± 0.020
P6 = 1 0.989 ± 0.018
P9 = 1 0.995 ± 0.013
PPullover = 1 0.991 ± 0.016
PDress = 1 0.994 ± 0.013
PSandal = 1 0.995 ± 0.013
PShirt = 1 0.994 ± 0.012
PAnkle Boot = 1 0.993 ± 0.015
P1 Cube = 1 0.983 ± 0.014
P1 Cylinder = 1 0.959 ± 0.031
P1 Sphere = 1 0.969 ± 0.022
P5 Cubes = 1 0.921 ± 0.029
Target Prediction Confidence
P0 = 1 0.996 ± 0.011
P1 = 1 0.994 ± 0.014
P2 = 1 0.998 ± 0.008
P3 = 1 0.994 ± 0.015
P4 = 1 0.997 ± 0.010
P5 = 1 0.998 ± 0.007
P6 = 1 0.996 ± 0.011
P7 = 1 0.996 ± 0.011
P8 = 1 0.995 ± 0.013
P9 = 1 0.996 ± 0.012
D More Details on the High-Confidence Example Experiment
Figure 9 presents additional high-confidence examples for CLEVR. Figure 10 presents additional high-confidence
examples for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
(a) P5 Sph. = 94.8% (b) P5 Sph. = 94.5% (c) P5 Sph. = 94.6% (d) P5 Sph. = 95.2% (e) P5 Sph. = 92.0%
(f) P2 Blue = 96.3% (g) P2 Blue = 96.1% (h) P2 Blue = 94.9% (i) P2 Blue = 96.8% (j) P2 Blue = 97.8%
Figure 9: Above, 9(a)–9(e): selected examples classified as containing 5 spheres with high confidence.
Below, 9(f)–9(j): selected examples classified as containing 2 blue spheres with high confidence.
(a) MNIST (b) Fashion-MNIST
Figure 10: High-confidence examples from MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. There are no misclassifica-
tions. MNIST columns represent digit 0 to 9, respectively. Fashion-MNIST columns represent t-shirt,
trousers, pullover, dress, coat, sandal, shirt, sneaker, bag, and ankle boot, respectively.
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E More Details on the Binary Ambivalent Example Experiments
Figure 5(a) in the main text presents a matrix showing one sampled image for each pair of classes from both
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST (e.g., Digit 1 vs. Digit 7; T-shirt vs. Pullover). Figure 11 presents additional
breakdowns for two pairs, Digit 1 vs. Digit 7 from MNIST and T-shirt vs. Pullover from Fashion-MNIST. The
violin plot confirms that the neural network is indeed making the target predictions of ambivalence, and the
latent visualization indicates that the samples lie around the class boundaries and are in-distribution (i.e., having
close proximity to others from the prior in the latent visualization with T-SNE [42] dimensionality reduction).
Figure 11: Left: ambivalent samples for digit 1 vs. 7 in MNIST. Right: ambivalent samples for
pullover vs. shirt in Fashion-MNIST. Top: 30 sampled images. Middle: the ambivalent predictions
made by the classifier. Bottom: latent space visualization. Green dots represent ambivalent samples
from the posterior, red and blue dots represents samples from the prior that are predicted by the
classifier to be either class of interest, and gray dots represents other samples from the prior. The
ambivalent samples are on the class boundaries.
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F More Details on the Graded-Confidence Example Experiments
BAYES-TREX can be used to sample confidence predictions which interpolate between classes. In Figure
12, we show MNIST samples which interpolate from (P8 = 1.0, P9 = 0.0) to (P8 = 0.0, P9 = 1.0) and
Fashion-MNIST samples from (PT-shirt = 1.0, PTrousers = 0.0) to (PT-shirt = 0.0, PTrousers = 1.0) over intervals
of 0.1, using a VAE as the generator. The target probability for other classes is 0.
By interpolating between two quite different classes, we can gain some insight into the model’s behaviour. For
example, in Figure 12, we see that the interpolation from 8 to 9 generally shrinks the bottom circle toward a
stroke, which is the key difference between digits 8 and 9 to be the width of the bottom circle. For Fashion-
MNIST, we consider the case of T-shirt vs. Trousers. We uncover that the presence of two legs is important
for trousers classification, even appearing in samples with (pT-shirt = 0.9,pTrousers = 0.1) (second column); by
contrast, a wider top and the appearance of sleeves are important properties for T-shirt classification: most of the
interpolated samples have a short sleeve on the top but two distinct legs on the bottom.
Figure 12: Confidence interpolation between digit 8 and 9 for MNIST and between T-shirt and
trousers for Fashion-MNIST. Each of the 11 columns show samples of confidence ranging from
[Pclass a = 1.0, Pclass b = 0.0] (left) to [Pclass a = 0.0, Pclass b = 1.0] (right), with an interval of 0.1.
Select confidence plots for MNIST samples are shown in the 2nd row.
G More Details on the Investigation into GAN Sampling Failure
We failed to sample binary ambivalent and graded confidence (Fashion-)MNIST examples using a GAN as the
generative distribution. There are two possible explanations:
1. the formulation of the posterior inference problem somehow is not suitable for a GAN-induced distribution,
and/or a Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo sampler cannot easily sample from the posterior; or
2. there are no GAN-generated examples that match the ambivalent prediction targets.
Empirically, we found that the neural network confidences on GAN images are very extreme (i.e. probability
very close to 1 for one class and very close to 0 for all other classes). In comparison, we found that the somewhat
blurry images produced by VAE have less extreme prediction confidences. We further confirmed that GANs
are better data generators than VAEs for our domains by computing FID scores (Appendix B). Therefore, we
believe the GAN is largely unable to produce examples which result in ambivalent predictions. This suggests the
classifier is consistently confident on high-quality examples.
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Figure 13: Sampling results with an explicitly ambivalent classifier and a GAN generator. Top 2 rows:
digit i vs. i+ 1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Bottom 2 rows: digit i vs. i+ 1 (mod 10) for i ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.
To verify this, we train a classifier on MNIST with intentionally binary ambivalent targets. Specifically, the loss
on an image x with groundtruth digit y ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9} is
l(y, f(x)) = KL(Py, f(x)), (11)
Py,i =
{
0.5 i = y or i = (y + 1) mod 10,
0 otherwise.
(12)
In words, we use a KL-divergence loss between the network predicted probability f(x) and a target that is
defined to be binary ambivalent between digit i and digit i+ 1 (wrapping around at 10 = 0).
After training, we find that the classifier is indeed confused between the two respective classes, and the
classification accuracy is very close to 50%, as expected. Then we use a GAN to sample image that are
ambivalent between digit i and i+ 1 (mod 10). Indeed, the sampler successfully returns images of class i from
the posterior (Fig. 13). The violin plots also confirm that the examples are correctly at the target level set. Note
that sampling examples that are binary ambivalent between other pairs of digits i and j still fails because the
network simply does not make such predictions on any images drawn from the GAN distribution. Similarly, for
this experiment, we cannot sample graded confidence examples with any confidence target other than (0.5, 0.5).
This raises the question of whether the typical MNIST and Fashion-MNIST are overconfident. By definition, a
high-performing network is not necessarily overconfident, even when highly confident on all examples [21]. We
conclude that these MNIST and Fashion-MNIST classifiers, with their average accuracies in the ≈99%-range,
are appropriately highly confident.
We similarly found BAYES-TREX is unable to sample ambivalent CLEVR examples. The data distribution for
CLEVR is rendered from a uniform prior, not learned; as a consequence, the resulting examples are high quality.
Unlike MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the CLEVR network only achieves accuracies of ≈60%. The inability to
sample ambiguous examples for the CLEVR network likely indicates overconfidence. Indeed, this problem has
been previously observed in CLEVR-style settings [29].
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H More Details on the In-Distribution Adversarial Examples Experiment
Many previous approaches reveal that neural network predictions are locally unstable; i.e. an input can be
slightly perturbed to make the network produce confident, incorrect predictions [56, 35, 4, 8, 46, 19]. Such
adversarial attacks produce examples that are out of distribution; indeed, a promising approach for detecting
or defending against adversarial examples relies on these examples being out-of-distribution [23, 14]. While
common adversarial examples highlight how a classifier can fail in malicious environments, BAYES-TREX
exposes “in-distribution” adversarial examples [18] and highlights how realistic examples can also cause failures.
Specifically, if we train the classifier on the entire dataset, but we perform sampling with the data distribution
induced by a generative model trained on data that are not from a particular class (Figure 3(b)), then the resulting
samples can be considered adversarial examples for that class. Figure 14 shows in-distribution adversarial
examples for CLEVR. For each target (e.g. “1 Cube”), we revoked the ability of the generator to produce objects
belonging to the target class (e.g., no cubes).
For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we sample in-distribution adversarial examples for each class; these are
presented in Fig. 15. Upon inspection, we observe several interesting phenomena. For MNIST, some of the very
thin 8s are classified as 1, stretched 9s are classified as 4, and a particular style of 2s and 3s are classified as
7. For Fashion-MNIST, most samples are between semantically similar classes, such as T-shirt↔ shirt, and
sneaker↔ ankle boot. However, we also see that chunky shoes are likely to be classified as bags. The sampling
procedure failed to find any adversarial examples for trousers class.
(a) P1 Cube = 96.0% (b) P1 Cube = 97.2% (c) P1 Cube = 93.5% (d) P1 Cube = 67.3% (e) P1 Cube = 94.5%
(f) P1 Sphere = 95.6% (g) P1 Sphere =
96.6%
(h) P1 Sphere =
89.8%
(i) P1 Sphere = 99.1% (j) P1 Sphere = 96.5%
(k) P1 Cyl. = 90.4% (l) P1 Cyl. = 98.6% (m) P1 Cyl. = 94.5% (n) P1 Cyl. = 96.5% (o) P1 Cyl. = 98.5%
(p) P2 Cyl. = 85.9% (q) P2 Cyl. = 60.2% (r) P2 Cyl. = 79.4% (s) P2 Cyl. = 48.4% (t) P2 Cyl. = 60.5%
Figure 14: Sampled in-distribution adversarial examples and their associated prediction confidences.
For each target constraint (e.g., “1 Cube”), the generator is unable to produce examples from the
target class (e.g., cubes).
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Figure 15: Samples and violin plots for in-distribution adversarial examples. Top two rows: digit 0-4;
bottom two rows: digit 5-9.
Figure 16: Samples and violin plots for in-distribution adversarial examples. Top row: T-shirt,
trousers (sample failure), pullover, dress, coat. Bottom row: sandal, shirt, sneaker, bag, ankle boot.
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I More Details on the OOD Extrapolation Experiment
While training and test distributions should ideally be the same, this assumption is often violated. One such
violation occurs when a model encounters data from a new class. For example, if an autonomous driving system
is trained on images of cars, pedestrians, and cyclists, it is desirable to know how such a model would behave
when it sees a tandem bike on the road. While many methods have been proposed to detect out-of-distribution
data [62, 11, 22, 38], BAYES-TREX facilitates model insight by finding examples from novel classes that are
likely to cause incorrect detections, and can help further understand any inductive biases the model may have.
Figure 17 shows novel class extrapolation examples for CLEVR. Similar to the protocol for generating in-
distribution adversarial examples, for each target (e.g. “1 Cube”), we revoked the ability of the generator to
produce objects belonging to the target class (e.g., no cubes). We also introduced a new class to the generator,
a cone. For the “5 Cubes” query, we increased the stopping criterion for Random-Walk Metropolis to 1500
examples; for all other experiments, we use the standard 500 samples criterion.
(a) P1 Sph. = 99.3% (b) P1 Sph. = 95.9% (c) P1 Sph. = 99.3% (d) P1 Sph. = 97.7% (e) P1 Sph. = 97.3%
(f) P1 Cube = 99.2% (g) P1 Cube = 97.5% (h) P1 Cube = 98.7% (i) P1 Cube = 99.0% (j) P1 Cube = 98.7%
(k) P1 Cyl. = 96.9% (l) P1 Cyl. = 99.1% (m) P1 Cyl. = 96.5% (n) P1 Cyl. = 97.2% (o) P1 Cyl. = 99.0%
(p) P5 Cubes = 74.6% (q) P5 Cubes = 89.5% (r) P5 Cubes = 93.3% (s) P5 Cubes = 91.6% (t) P5 Cubes = 89.9%
Figure 17: Sampled novel class extrapolation examples and their associated prediction confidences.
Similar to in-distribution adversarial examples, for each target constraint (e.g., “1 Cube”), we deprive
the generator of the ability to produce examples from the target class (e.g., cubes). For extrapolation,
we equip the data generator with the ability to generate cones, a novel class not present in the training
distribution. 17(n) is the only generated sample which does not include an object of the novel class.
To evaluate this extrapolation case on (Fashion-)MNIST, we consider the case of disjoint classifier and generator
support as in Fig. 3(d). We split a dataset D into two disjoint parts, D1 and D2 by class label sets C1 and C2
respectively, with C1 ∩ C2 = ∅. Then we train a classifier on D1 and a GAN generator on D2. We then sample
high-confidence examples for each class in C1 from the GAN-induced distribution. For MNIST, we choose
C1 = {0, 1, 3, 6, 9}, and C2 = {2, 4, 5, 7, 8}. For Fashion-MNIST, we choose C1 = {Pullover, Dress, Sandal,
Shirt, Ankle boot}, and C2 = {T-shirt, Trousers, Coat, Sneaker, Bag}. Fig. 7(c, d) depicts samples from a GAN
trained on D2 for which the classifier trained on D1 has high confidence for classes in C1.
Fig. 18 shows examples for novel-class extrapolation on MNIST. The classifier is trained on digit 0, 1, 3, 6
and 9, and tested on images generated by a GAN trained on digit 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Fig. 19 shows examples for
novel-class extrapolation on Fashion-MNIST. The classifier is trained on pullover, dress, sandal, shirt and ankle
boot, and tested on images generated by a GAN trained on T-shirt, trousers, coat, sneaker and bag.
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For Fashion-MNIST, some results are intuitive. For example, the only shoe class in set C2 is “sneaker,” which
accounts for most of the “sandal” and “ankle boot” predictions. The same is true for “T-shirt” → “shirt.”
Nevertheless, the classifier will also classify most of trousers as dresses, and bags of different styles will be
classified as dresses, sandals, shirts, and ankle boots, despite visual dissimilarity. By comparison, for MNIST, it
is hard to explain most of the samples. Several digits (e.g., 7) are inconsistently classified as different classes (i.e.,
split across 0, 1, and 9), likely because the digits are too visually distinct to allow for reasonable extrapolation.
Figure 18: Samples and violin plots for novel-class extrapolation. Examples drawn from classifier
classes (0, 1, 3, 6 and 9, in that order).
Figure 19: Samples and violin plots for novel-class extrapolation. Examples drawn from classifier
classes (pullover, dress, sandal, shirt and ankle boot, in that order).
22
J More Details on the Domain Adaptation Experiment
In domain adaptation, we have a source domain XS and a target domain XT , with shared label set C and
cross-domain consistent decision rule p(y|x) [2, 40, 61]. The need for domain adaptation arises when the
non-causal features vary across datasets. For example, for object recognition, lighting condition does not
affect the object’s identity, and domain adaptation techniques can be applied to learn on bright images while
being tested on dark ones. Domain adaptation is especially important in robotics, where algorithms trained in
simulation often fail when using real sensor data in deployment [50, 59, 57].
To inspect a domain adaptation model, we sample high-confidence examples from the target domain for each
class as predicted by the source-trained classifier. In our experiments, we train the adversarial discriminative
domain adaptation (ADDA) model [60] using the code provided by the authors without modification1, with
Street View House Number (SVHN) [44] as the source domain and MNIST as the target domain. We also trained
a baseline model with the same architecture on SVHN without the domain adaptation technique. Overall, we
found that the baseline model achieves 61% target accuracy on MNIST, while the ADDA model achieves 71%.
To gain further insight into the domain adapted model, we sampled MNIST images with high prediction
confidence for each class. Figure 20 shows additional samples and violin plots for the baseline model in the
domain adaptation analysis. Top two rows are for digit 0-4, and bottom two rows are for digit 5-9. Figure 21
shows additional samples and violin plots for the adversarial discriminative domain adaptation (ADDA) model
in the domain adaptation analysis. Top two rows are for digit 0-4, and bottom two rows are for digit 5-9.
Although the average confidence for the target class is over 99%, we can see both models have several wrong
predictions. For example, some digit 6s are confidently classified as 4s by the baseline model, while some 0s
are classified as 1s by the ADDA model. In addition, for each model and each target digit, we performed a
human labeling on 10 images, and we check how many of those images are correctly labeled. The result is
summarized in Table 8. Surprisingly, on high confidence samples, the baseline model is more accurate than the
ADDA model. Although this does not fundamentally contradict the improved transfer performance for ADDA,
this does highlight a concerning fact: ADDA seems to suffer from the overconfidence problem more severely, as
a larger proportion of high confidence samples are incorrect. This fine-grained analysis suggests the need for
more extensive investigation into and potential calibration of confidence for domain adaptation models.
Table 8: Per-digit and aggregate accuracy among high confidence MNIST samples for the baseline
and domain adjusted (ADDA) models. While the ADDA model has overall higher accuracy than the
baseline (0.71 vs. 0.61), on high-confidence samples it has lower accuracy than the baseline (0.72
vs. 0.80), suggesting an overconfident ADDA model.
Model \ Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 All
Baseline 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.80
ADDA 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.72
1https://github.com/erictzeng/adda. SVHN images are converted to gray-scale and 28×28 to match
MNIST data.
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Figure 20: High confident MNIST samples generated for each class as predicted by the baseline
model trained on SVHN dataset. Top row: digits 0-4. Bottom row: digits 5-9.
Figure 21: High confident MNIST samples generated for each class as predicted by the ADDA model
trained on SVHN dataset. Top row: digits 0-4. Bottom row: digits 5-9.
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K Case Study: Using BAYES-TREX with Saliency Maps
BAYES-TREX is a tool for mining interesting inputs to increase the breadth of evaluation beyond the data
contained in the test set. By selecting appropriate distributions from the test and/or training sets, BAYES-
TREX can expose additional interesting examples which communicate model behaviours. Local interpretability
techniques, such as saliency maps, can in turn be applied to these examples to derive insights. We use
SmoothGrad saliency maps for our evaluation [55], as this technique passes the saliency map sanity checks [1].
Fig. 24 shows several examples of CLEVR inputs and their accompanying SmoothGrad saliency maps.
K.1 In-distribution Adversarial Examples
Consider an example of an in-distribution adversarial example, uncovered by BAYES-TREX. Figure 22 shows
one such example and its saliency map in which the classifier has high confidence contains 1 cube though the
scene is composed of only cylinders and spheres. The scene is pre-processed for input to the CLEVR classifier.
This pre-processing step includes resizing the image to 224×224 pixels. The accompanying saliency map
suggests that the red metal cylinder is the cause of the classifier’s confusion.
Figure 22: Left: the original image, preprocessed for classification by resizing and normalizing. The
classifier is 93.5% confident this scene contains 1 cube, when in fact it is composed of 3 cylinders
and 2 spheres. Middle: the SmoothGrad saliency map for this input. Right: the saliency map overlaid
upon the original image. This saliency map most strongly highlights the red metal cylinder, indicating
that this cylinder is likely the cause of the misclassification.
We re-render the scene, removing each object and re-classifying. As shown in Figure 23 and suggested by the
original saliency map, we find the classifier mistook the red metal cylinder as a cube. Removing the red metal
cylinder reduces the classifier’s confidence that the scene contained 1 Cube from 93.5% to 29.0%.
(a) P1 Cube = 29.0% (b) P1 Cube = 68.5% (c) P1 Cube = 81.2% (d) P1 Cube = 99.0% (e) P1 Cube = 99.4%
Figure 23: Re-rendering the scene, leaving out each object in turn. (a) The red metal cylinder is
removed. (b) The green cylinder is removed. (c) The green sphere is removed. (d) The red rubber
cylinder is removed. (e) The purple sphere is removed. As suggested by the saliency map, the removal
of the red metal cylinder most prominently reduces the classification confidence, from 93.5% to
29.0%. The other scenes see a smaller confidence drop, and are still classified as containing one cube.
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(a) Original image: P1 Cube = 85.5%. Purple cylinder removed: P1 Cube = 1.9%
(b) Original image: P1 Sphere = 97.9%. Yellow cylinder removed: P1 Sphere = 5.2%
(c) Original image: P1 Cylinder = 85.4%. Red sphere removed: P1 Cylinder = 0.9%
(d) Original image: P1 Cube = 99.7%. Cone removed: P1 Cube = 0.4%
(e) Original image: P1 Sphere = 98.0%. Gray cone removed: P1 Sphere = 0.3%
Figure 24: Images sampled with BAYES-TREX and their saliency maps. 24(a)-24(c) are in-
distribution adversarial examples; 24(d)-24(e) are novel class extrapolation examples. In 24(e),
the saliency map primarily highlights two objects: the red cone and the blue cylinder. Removing
either of these objects does not result in a change of prediction. Instead, the misclassification of 1
Sphere is due to the marginally-highlighted gray cone.
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